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Abstract
While it has long been recognised that active management is an important issue in the
area of mutual fund performance, little consensus has been reached about the value managers’
abilities can add. This study examines funds’ and managers’ characteristics in an attempt
to understand their influence on mutual fund efficiency. We explore these issues in a two-
stage approach, considering partial frontier estimators (order-m, order-α) to assess performance
in the first stage, and quantile regression in the second stage to isolate the determinants of
efficiency. This combination of methodologies has barely been considered to date in the field of
operations research. Our findings are of interest to both academics and practitioners as they
shed light on the differences among funds as well as among managers. Our analysis provides
some arguments to guide fund selection and points to some managerial features investors might
consider taking into account. In addition, some of the differences in performance among funds
are rather intricate because both the magnitude of the estimated regression coefficients and
their significance varies depending on the quantile of the distribution of fund performance,
suggesting that some relevant trends might be concealed by conditional-mean models such as
Tobit or OLS.
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1. Introduction
Performance evaluation of mutual funds has attracted the interest of researchers and industry
participants alike for some decades now. Although in its early stages this literature focused mainly
on the design and empirical applications of methodologies to analyse performance (or efficiency),
today the factors related to the decision-making process and their consequences for fund efficiency
are arousing growing academic attention. In this context, the literature on portfolio evaluation has
evolved dramatically since the late eighties. This has partly paralleled the evolution of asset pricing
models that consider different methodological approaches, sources of risk and other variables to
adjust returns. Since most investments are handled by professional managers, it is important to
consider the role they are playing and, if possible, to measure how they can affect performance.
Managers have the ultimate power to design a portfolio consistent with their set of objectives and
policies.
The role of the manager or the team of managers is gaining prominence in fund efficiency
analysis. Managers have always enjoyed the limelight because their decisions are directly related
to investors’ profits. From a manager’s point of view, the reward scheme is primarily based on
economic incentives (fees), although other motivations such as reputation, contracts, or job loss
might also underlie their expectations (Brown et al., 1996; Goetzmann et al., 2003; Alexander et al.,
2007; Kempf et al., 2009). These and other related priorities may be affected by the decisions taken
by each manager or team of managers.
Funds have traditionally been managed by individual specialists. However, even in cases where
an auxiliary management team is involved, the final decision usually rests with the principal
manager. Nowadays, for a significant share of managed funds, teams tend to reach a consensus
prior to executing an order. From the point of view of the investor it could seem that the risk of
error is more diversified (or more indirect), since the decision does not depend solely on one person.
From an academic viewpoint, the way decisions are made has prompted several research initiatives
on mutual fund management. Academics are becoming aware of managerial characteristics that can
be measured, the influence of which is closely related to the fund’s performance and/or efficiency.
It is generally accepted that mutual funds, considered jointly, underperform the market or
benchmarks; according to Ferson (2010), performance is typically negative when averaged across
funds. However, other approaches, such as those of Ippolito (1989) or Cohen et al. (2005), argue
that managers display some skills that enable the funds they manage to beat the market. Our study
explores this possibility in an attempt to understand managers’ influence as a source of differences
in mutual fund efficiencies. Specifically, in relation to the structure of management, there is
no consensus as to whether individual or team management might generate efficiency differentials.
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Therefore, as well as estimating the degree of efficiency for each fund, in a second stage of this study
we also analyse the determinants of mutual fund performance and/or efficiency, with an explicit
focus on the role of managers, in order to identify which factors influence better performance.
However, although the study focuses more closely on the role of managers, we split the analysis
of determinants into two main sources of variation, or types of information that may influence
fund efficiencies, namely: (i) the structure and features of the fund; (ii) some characteristics of the
manager or team of managers.
We consider frontier techniques to measure efficiency in this study. Specifically, as noted
recently by Glawischnig and Sommersguter-Reichmann (2010), interest has been growing in the
application of the deterministic data envelopment analysis (DEA) method (without losing sight of
more standard methodologies) to measure the performance of financial investments, particularly
mutual funds (see also Tarnaud and Leleu, 2018). In this study, we propose going beyond the DEA
and related approaches (such as free disposal hull, FDH, its non-convex counterpart) considered
so far in the literature to measure the degree of efficiency of each fund since, despite their virtues
for measuring mutual fund performance, these methods also have some shortcomings. Specifically,
they suffer from a lack of robustness because they are envelopment estimators, and as such they are
very sensitive to extremes and/or outliers in the output direction. This ultimately results in poor
estimation of the corresponding efficiencies. However, the literature has evolved and has recently
proposed two new estimators, namely, the order-m estimator (Cazals et al., 2002) and the order-α
estimator (Aragon et al., 2005), both of which are qualitatively robust and bias robust.
In this paper we are particularly interested in providing some answers to the puzzling question
of whether active fund managers are able to add value. To this end, our second-stage strategy
takes into account the fact that the distributions of mutual fund performances can have peculiar
shapes, or be heavy-tailed. Under such circumstances, it may be misleading to use regression
techniques that focus on the “average effect for the average fund”. Instead, we use a quantile
regression approach (Koenker, 2001), which allows us to examine the relationship between the
set of managers’ characteristics we consider (along with other likely determinants) at a range of
points in the conditional mutual fund performance distribution. This approach is more informative
than an OLS regression, for instance, since it might be the case that managerial abilities are more
relevant for certain funds—for instance, the highest performing ones—than for the average fund. In
addition, whilst the optimal properties of standard regression estimators are not robust to modest
departures from normality, quantile regression results are characteristically robust to outliers and
heavy-tailed distributions (Coad and Rao, 2008).
From an Operations Research (OR) point of view, this is particularly important given that
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performing a second-stage regression can be problematic when the first stage yields efficiency scores
obtained via either DEA or FDH (and, to a lesser extent, order-m and order-α). This point has
been convincingly made by Léopold Simar and Paul W. Wilson (Simar and Wilson, 2007, 2011),
and has had a remarkable impact on the OR literature, resulting in the publication of several
contributions on the topic including Banker and Natarajan (2008), Hoff (2007), McDonald (2009),
among others. However, the combination of linear programming (OR) techniques to measure
efficiency in the first stage, with quantile regression to evaluate the determinants of efficiency in
the second stage has barely been contemplated in either the OR or mutual fund performance
literatures. When the specific aim is to analyse how different managers’ characteristics might
influence funds’ performance combining the two approaches (i.e., DEA/FDH and the like in the
first stage, quantile regression in the second stage) the number of studies is virtually zero.
Thus, the contribution of this paper is three-fold. First, we explore fund managers’ character-
istics and their potential effects on portfolio efficiency. For this purpose, several features of the
manager are analysed, focusing particularly on the rise of team-managed funds in the US mutual
fund industry—without discriminating other variables that have also gained importance in recent
times. We detect that teams of managers are positively associated with fund efficiency. This is a
topic that enriches the literature dealing with active management and mutual fund performance,
on which contributions based on OR techniques are scarce. Second, building on Abdelsalam et al.
(2014), and following recent proposals in the field (Chen, 2019), we propose using a two-stage
method which consists of evaluating mutual fund performance via partial frontier estimators in
the first stage, in combination with quantile regression in the second stage. In the specific area of
manager characteristics and their impact on fund performance, which is thriving (see, for instance
Bessler et al., 2018; Ma et al., 2019; Moreno et al., 2018), this approach has not been previously
considered. In addition, and from a more methodological point of view, it contributes to the debate
in an area in which the issue of the role of environmental variables has not been fully addressed, as
shown by Bădin et al. (2014), among others.1 Our results actually show that because the effect of
managers’ characteristics (in combination with other fund characteristics) is not constant across
the distribution of efficiency scores, it is easy to miss the global impact of covariates, particularly
when inspecting the upper and lower tails (best and the worst funds). Finally, our methods are
applied to a large updated sample of US mutual funds, classified into several different categories.
This is not a contribution per se, but makes the study more appealing to a broader audience.
1Actually, in some fields such as the determinants of local government performance, some surveys have specifically
revised the literature on its determinants (see, for instance Aiello and Bonanno, 2019; Narbón-Perpiñá and De Witte,
2018). More recently, and for the interested reader, Daraio et al. (2019) have reviewed all empirical surveys that, in
the field of efficiency and productivity analysis using frontier techniques, are available so far.
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The remainder of this paper is organised as follows. Section 2 presents the methods selected
to measure performance and to analyse its determinants. Section 3 describes the data, the fund
attributes and the set of determinants. Results are reported and discussed in Section 4. Finally,
Section 5 presents some concluding remarks.
2. Methodology
2.1. Order-m and order-α estimators
As Simar and Wilson (2008) point out, Farrell (1957) first attempted to empirically estimate
efficiency scores for a set of observed production units—in our case, mutual funds (Simar and
Wilson, 2008, p.421). This first requires us to define the set of attainable combinations of inputs
(x) and outputs (y), i.e., the production set, Ψ, which is:
Ψ = {(x,y) ∈ Rp+q+ |(x,y) are attainable} (1)
where x ∈ Rp+ is the vector of inputs and y ∈ Rq+ is the vector of outputs. For all possible output
values we can define the section of possible values of x as
X(y) = {x ∈ Rp+|(x,y) ∈ Ψ} (2)
In this particular setting the Farrell (1957) measure of input-oriented efficiency of a given
mutual fund with input-output mix (x,y) is defined as
θ̃(x,y) = inf{θ : (θx,y) ∈ Ψ} = min{θ : θx ∈ X(y)}, (3)
where θ(x,y) is the proportionate reduction of inputs required for a mutual fund with the input-
output mix (x,y) to become efficient, i.e., to achieve the value of 1, since the efficient frontier
corresponds to those funds whose θ̃(x,y) = 1.
In the case of output efficiency scores, the production set Ψ is characterized by the output
feasibility sets defined for all x ∈ Rp+. In this case, for all possible input values we define the set
of possible values of y as
Y (x) = {y ∈ Rq+|(x,y) ∈ Ψ} (4)
In this output-oriented setting the Farrell (1957) measure of output-oriented efficiency of a
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given mutual fund (x,y) is defined as
θ̃(x,y) = sup{θ : (x, θy) ∈ Ψ} = max{θ : θy ∈ Y (x)}, (5)
According to either DEA or FDH, the efficiency measure is obtained by comparing with the
full frontier of all observations, defining the maximum output that is technically feasible with a
given level of inputs. Alternatively, according to the order-m estimators, what is actually used as
a benchmark is the expected maximum output achieved by any m funds chosen randomly from
the population, which employs at most input level x.
Therefore, for any y, the expected maximum level is defined as:
y∂ = θ̃y. (6)
When we choose a high value for m (m → ∞), the order-m estimator gives the same benchmark
as FDH, yielding the same results. Therefore, the most interesting cases are those for which we
define a finite value for m. In these cases the order-m does not envelop all the data, as it is more
robust to data outliers.
Note that the order-m efficiency scores are not bounded by 1 as in the case of DEA or FDH. In
these cases, values equal to unity correspond to efficient funds, whereas values higher than unity
correspond to inefficient funds. Order-m can yield values for θ lower than one, indicating that the
fund operating at the level (x,y) is more efficient than the average of m peers randomly drawn
from the population of units using fewer inputs than x.
Formally, the proposed algorithm (Cazals et al., 2002) to compute the order-m estimator com-
prises the following steps, for n funds, i = 1, . . . , n:
1. For a given level of x0, draw a random sample of size m with replacement among those xi,
such that xi ≤ x0.
2. Obtain the efficiency measures, θ̃i.
3. Repeat steps 1 and 2 B times and obtain B efficiency coefficients θ̃bi (b = 1, 2, . . . , B). The
quality of the approximation can be tuned by increasing B, but in most applications B = 200
seems to be a reasonable choice (and this coincides with ours).
4. Compute the empirical mean of B samples as:
θ̄mi =
1
B
B∑
b=1
θ̃bi (7)
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A similar estimator to order-m, and that shares some of its underpinnings is the order-α
quantile-type frontier. The idea of order-α is the opposite of order-m: whereas the m parameter
of order-Malmquist serves as a trimming parameter for tuning the percentage of points that lie
above the frontier, in the case of order-α the frontier is determined by first fixing the probability
(1 − α) of observing points above the order-α frontier. Therefore, with order-α we reverse the
causation and choose the proportion of the data lying directly above the frontier.
Order-α partial frontiers were originally proposed by Aragon et al. (2005) in the univariate case
and were extended to the multivariate case by Daouia and Simar (2007). Similarly to the order-m
estimators, order-α estimators also have better properties than the usual nonparametric frontier
estimators (either DEA or FDH). They are
√
n-consistent estimators of the full frontier, since the
order of the frontier is allowed to grow with sample size. They are asymptotically unbiased and
normally distributed with a known expression for the variance (see Aragon et al., 2005). It has
also been shown (see Daouia and Simar, 2007) that order-α frontiers are more robust to extremes
than order-m frontiers (see Daraio and Simar, 2007, p.74).
Yet the main virtue of order-α estimators is the same as that of order-m, i.e. the fact that in
finite samples, order-α estimators do not envelop all the data, and they are therefore more robust
to outliers than FDH or DEA. These outliers which, in the particular output-oriented case we
are dealing with have an efficiency score of 1, are considered as super-efficient with respect to the
order-α frontier level.
In addition, analogously to order-m partial frontiers, where a mutual fund operating at (x,y)
is benchmarked against the expected maximum output (recall we are dealing with the output-
oriented case) among m peers drawn randomly from the population of funds with output levels of
at least y, in the case of order-α quantile frontiers the benchmark is the output level not exceeded
by (1− α)× 100% of funds among the population of funds providing input levels of at least x.
Following Simar and Wilson (2008), for α ∈ (0, 1], the α-quantile output efficiency score for
the mutual fund operating at (x,y) ∈ Ψ can be defined as
θα(x,y) = sup{θ|Fy|x(θy|x) > 1− α} (8)
We have that θα(x,y) converges to the FDH estimator θ(x,y) when α → 1. As indicated in
Daraio and Simar (2007), in cases where θα(x,y) = 1, the fund is “efficient” at the level α×100%,
since it is dominated by mutual funds providing less input than x with probability 1 − α. In
those cases where θα(x,y) > 1 the unit (x,y) has to increase its output to the level θα(y,y)x to
achieve the output efficient frontier of level α× 100%. We can also apply the plug-in principle to
obtain an intuitive nonparametric estimator of θα(x,y) = 1 by replacing Fy|x(·|·) with its empirical
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counterpart to obtain:
θ̂α,n(x,y) = sup{θ|F̂y|x,n(θy|x) > 1− α} (9)
2.2. Analyzing the determinants of mutual fund performance using regression quan-
tiles
Typical linear models such as ordinary least squares (OLS) or logistic regression models (e.g. To-
bit) have for years been the workhorse of applied economics and finance researchers. They provide
the analyst with information that, albeit extremely valuable, is confined to the analysis of average
impacts of the covariates on the variable of interest—in our case, mutual fund performance. Un-
fortunately, this implies missing relevant information, since the impact over the entire conditional
distribution of efficiencies could vary depending on different parts of the distribution such as the
upper and lower tails or, more generally, on each particular quantile (Coad and Hölzl, 2009).
The analysis of the differential impact on each quantile is actually possible using quantile
regression (see, for instance Buchinsky, 1998; Taylor and Bunn, 1999), the main advantage of
which is its capability to estimate the conditional quantiles of a response variable distribution—
which in our case would be the performance of mutual funds—in a linear model providing a
fuller view of the likely causal relationships between the variables considered in the analysis.
Quantile regression has additional advantages that are particularly suited to the application we
are dealing with, since social phenomena are usually plagued with non-standard conditions such
as non-normality or heteroskedasticity. These conditions make it difficult to meet the assumptions
on which OLS models are based. For instance, managerial finance data such as the dispersion of
the annual compensation of chief executive officers is usually expected to increase with firm size,
suggesting the existence of heteroskedasticity. Taking into account the advantageous features of
quantile regression, applications have flourished over the last few years, a compendium of which is
provided by Fitzenberger et al. (2002).
Therefore, in the setting we deal with here, quantile regression allows us to consider the entire
distribution of mutual fund performances when analysing how the different covariates impact
on performance, providing us with a more complete view of the relationship among variables.
Accordingly, we can examine whether the sign and significance of the determinants is the same
for low-performance mutual funds (i.e. those corresponding to the lower quantiles) as for high-
performance funds (i.e. those corresponding to the highest quantiles). It is then possible to more
precisely disentangle the factors which cause mutual fund performance to differ. These arguments
imply that we consider both high- and low-performance funds to be of interest per se, as well as
those corresponding to other quantiles of the conditional distribution.
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In the field of finance and mutual fund evaluation, the relatively modest number of studies
using quantile regression methods has been growing in the last few years. For instance, Bassett Jr
and Chen (2001) use regression quantiles to extract additional information from the time series of
returns by identifying the way style affects returns at places other than the average. Meligkotsidou
et al. (2009) introduce the idea of modelling the conditional quantiles of hedge fund returns using
a set of risk factors, whereas Luo and Li (2008) investigate whether and how futures market
sentiment and stock market returns heterogeneously affect the trading activities of institutional
investors in the Taiwan spot market. The aims of our paper are closer to those of Füss et al.
(2009), who analyse the impact of experience and size of hedge funds on performance, or Chen
and Huang (2011), who study the relation between mutual fund performance and Morningstar
fiduciary grades, in both cases using quantile regression. However, none of these contributions
has considered partial frontier methods to evaluate performance in the first stage of the analysis,
nor have they taken an explicit approach to analyse how the covariates that more closely reflect
managers’ characteristics influence mutual fund performance.
It can, however, be troublesome to consider a two-stage method in which efficiencies are ob-
tained using, for instance, DEA or FDH in the first stage, and then analysing determinants in
the second stage. Simar and Wilson (2007) proposed a bootstrap method that overcame many of
the difficulties found in the previous literature—which were mostly related to the combination of
nonparametric methods such as DEA or FDH in the first stage with parametric methods such as
OLS or Tobit regressions in the second stage.2 Other approaches to deal with this issue include,
for instance, Banker and Natarajan (2008). In the particular case of mutual fund performance
evaluation, Daraio and Simar (2006) have proposed alternative nonparametric methods to over-
come the problems derived from estimating regressions where the dependent variable is obtained
by solving linear programming problems.
In this scenario, an additional advantage of using quantile regression in the context of evaluating
the determinants of mutual fund performance is that the standard least-squares assumption of
normally distributed errors does not hold for our data because the location patterns follow a fat-
tailed distribution (Coad and Hölzl, 2009). However, although standard regression estimators are
not robust to departures from normality, the quantile regression estimator is characteristically
robust to outliers on the dependent variable (Buchinsky, 1998). Furthermore, quantile regression
also relaxes the restrictive assumption that the error terms are identically distributed at all points
of the conditional distribution. Avoiding this assumption makes it easier to analyse discrepancies
in the relationship between the endogenous and exogenous variables at different points of the
2For instance, the efficiency scores obtained using linear programming techniques are dependent by construction.
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conditional distribution of the dependent variable, i.e. mutual fund efficiencies.
The regression quantiles specify the τ th quantile of the conditional distribution of yi, where yi
is the variable containing the performance of mutual funds which, in our case, are either θ̄mi or
θ̂α,n, given x as a linear function of the covariates. Estimation is performed by minimizing the
following equation:
Min
β∈Rk
∑
i∈{i:yi≥x′β}
τ |yi − x′β|+
∑
i∈{i:yi<x′β}
(1− τ)|yi − x′β| (10)
where k is the number of explanatory variables, τ represents the vector containing each quantile,
and the vector of coefficients to be estimated, β, differs depending on the particular quantile.
3. Data and sample
3.1. Data sources
We obtained equity fund data from Morningstar. Our data correspond to US mutual funds, and
the sample period runs from January 1st, 2000, to December 31st, 2016. The sample comprises the
universe of open-end funds domiciled and available in the US, and comprising different categories
of funds, as shown in Table 1. Although the nine main categories of funds correspond to the
combinations of large, mid-cap and small with value, blend and growth, there are also some other
categories which we also included in the sample. However, these other categories contain a much
lower number of funds (737 fund-year pairs) compared to the 32,222 corresponding to the nine
main categories. Therefore, a total of 32,959 fund-year pairs are classified in all categories, and
we consider monthly average returns for the aforementioned period (i.e., the number corresponds
to the sum of the available funds for each of the 17 sample years, and the number of funds varies
depending on each year due to unavailable information or fund creation/disappearance). For
each mutual fund, Morningstar provides historical information on some fund characteristics and
managerial attributes, as well as the variables that we label as inputs or outputs. Unfortunately,
the sample is somewhat smaller than what a priori it could be due to unavailable information for
several inputs and outputs for some years.
The Morningstar dataset provides information on all mutual funds operating during the period
considered. Thus we consider both funds that disappeared during the period and new funds
incorporated and, consequently, the data used is free of survivorship bias.
3.2. Input and output selection
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To apply our methodological approach we define some variables as inputs and outputs. The main
output we consider is the daily mean return over the sample period (y1), assuming reinvestment of
all income and capital gain distributions. The other output (skewness, measuring the asymmetry
of the distribution, y2) was also computed from the monthly average return distribution. The
inputs are the risk of the fund, measured by the standard deviation of the monthly average returns
(x1), and kurtosis (x2),
3 also computed from the monthly average returns. In some of the proposed
models the degree of active management and costs of the fund are also considered as inputs. Two
variables are considered to include them, namely, the expense ratio, representing the percentage
paid as management fees including managers’ compensation and operating expenses (x3), and the
annualized turnover ratio, as a measure of trading activity or the manager’s propensity to trade
(x4). We also consider the beta as an input, x5, since it measures the systematic risk, also known as
“undiversifiable risk” or “market risk”. Finally, we consider size as a possible source of economies
of scale in mutual fund management. We measured size as the average of the amount of managed
assets over the sample period.
The descriptive statistics for inputs and outputs are presented in Table 1, which also displays
the different fund classes considered. Part of the information in this table deserves additional
explanations. On average (as well as for the median), the beta for “growth” funds is higher than
that for either “blend” or “value” funds, since they invest in stocks with higher levels of systematic
risk. The beta is reported by Morningstar, which computes mutual funds’ beta by adjusting the
market index depending on the fund’s category. Table 1 also shows that, in the case of “growth”
funds, the turnover (x4) for the first quartile is, for both the mean and the median, much higher
than that corresponding to the other two categories (either “blend” or “value”), which might be
indicative of active management.
3.3. Determinants of mutual fund performance
In order to match our study more closely to the literature on the determinants of mutual fund
performance, we define a set of fund-related variables, in addition to considering the aforementioned
fund classification—small/mid-cap/large, blend/growth/value. Specifically, we consider two sets
of likely determinants of fund performance, some of which are fund characteristics, whereas others
are managers’ attributes. The fund characteristics considered are: (i) fund size (in logs), deemed as
an indicator of economies of scale; and (ii) age of the fund (in years), assumed to be a reasonable
proxy for the competitiveness of the fund. Characteristics of managers or teams of managers
3In the case of non-normal distributions, Glawischnig and Sommersguter-Reichmann (2010) consider taking non-
central measures by using information about skewness and kurtosis. See also Briec et al. (2007) and Brandouy et al.
(2013). We dealt with the negative values found both for both skewness and kurtosis by rescaling both variables.
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considered are: (i) managerial ownership, a dummy variable taking a value of 1 in the case of
manager ownership, 0 otherwise; (ii) manager structure, also a dummy variable taking the value
of 1 for multiple managers and 0 in the case of a single manager; (iii) number of funds under the
same management (i.e., funds managed per manager or team of managers); (iv) tenure of active
management, related to managers’ experience which should be an indicator of their investing
abilities; and (v) number of funds under the same management (i.e., funds managed per manager
or team of managers).
3.3.1. Fund characteristics
According to Chen et al. (2004), the expected impact of FS (fund size) is that small funds out-
perform large funds. Ferreira et al. (2013) also find that small US mutual funds perform better
than large funds, but this negative size effect is not consistent when non-US funds are considered.
However, other scholars such as Carhart (1997) suggest that a positive relationship between fund
size and performance may arise from the benefits of economies of scale. The literature assessing
the impact of size on performance is therefore not conclusive, and some of these disparate results
are reviewed in Bertin and Prather (2009). Our methodologies might fit this context particularly
well, since an inconclusive link could be related to varying coefficients for the different quantiles of
the conditional distribution of performance. Regarding the other covariate related intrinsic to the
fund, Hu and Chang (2008) found that the expected impact of fund age (FA) is that performance
worsens with the age of the fund. However, Chen et al. (2004) and Ferreira et al. (2013), among
others, find no evidence of a relation between fund age and performance. Again, the evidence is
mixed.
3.3.2. Managers’ characteristics
We assess whether managerial ownership is related to positive past performance. In this regard,
Khorana et al. (2007a) find a positive relation between fund manager ownership and performance,
observing in particular a link between positive managerial ownership and future performance. They
reinforce this evidence considering both the incentives to generate higher performance and also the
superior level of information the managers participating in the funds may have. In the same vein,
Evans (2008) argues that funds with higher managerial ownership exhibit better performance. In
addition, Fu and Wedge (2011) investigate the impact of the investment behaviour—measuring
the disposition effect as an anomaly, according to which investors tend to sell winning assets
while keeping losing value assets—together with manager ownership and portfolio performance.
These authors partly justify the superior performance achieved by the funds that participated
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with higher managerial ownership in combination with the absence of the disposition effect. In
contrast, Kumlin and Puttonen (2009) report conflicting evidence showing no relation between
performance and manager ownership. More recently, Hornstein and Hounsell (2016) find that the
positive relation between manager ownership and performance is consistent for solo management,
but diluted for team-managed funds.
The role of multiple (team) or single managers (MM) varies, according to studies by Chen
et al. (2004), or Bär et al. (2011); team performance has a negative impact compared with single
managers’ performance. In contrast, Han et al. (2017) find a positive impact of team management
on mutual fund performance. Mid-way between these conflicting views, Prather and Middleton
(2002) find no differences in the performance of funds handled by a single manager or by a team
of managers.
The literature has also considered whether managers’ tenure (TEN), namely, their years of
experience, might also have an impact on fund performance. Malhotra et al. (2007) find no
empirical evidence to support this effect. In contrast, Golec (1996) claim a positive relation
between tenure and performance. In the same vein, Khorana et al.’s (2007b) results indicate that
the best performance is related to longer managerial tenure, similarly to Agarwal et al. (2009),
who conclude that experienced managers outperform their inexperienced counterparts. Although
the studies supporting the positive link dominate, there are differing views such as those of Boyson
(2010), who found that the link is actually negative—performance deteriorates with managerial
experience.
The effect of the number of mutual funds under the same management (MF ) is examined by
Prather et al. (2004), among others, who find that performance worsens when managers handle
more than two funds, as a result of reduced effectiveness due to the dispersion of effort, time and
consciousness. This result is supported by Hu and Chang (2008), whose findings indicate that a
fund’s performance falls when the number of managed funds increases. However, other authors
such as Huij and Derwall (2011) conclude that the more concentrated the portfolios, the better the
performance, due to some pernicious effects derived from diversification that contribute to eroding
performance.
Also related to managers’ characteristics, it is interesting to consider other features such as sub-
advising. As Moreno et al. (2018) have recently pointed out, mutual funds’ managers outsource
portfolio management in pursuit of several benefits such as access to talent that is not available in-
house. This allows them to expand their mutual fund family to include new investment styles and,
ultimately, increase the volume of assets under management. Outsourcing can therefore improve
the efficiency of the portfolios offered, and firms’ managers can gain market share in the mutual
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fund industry. The literature is not unanimous on this respect, however, since empirical evidence
from Chen et al. (2013) shows that outsourced funds underperform those internally managed.
In sum, these are some of the variables that the most relevant literature has considered to anal-
yse how managerial and other related characteristics affect fund performance. However, although
much of the reviewed literature has identified strong links between the variables under analysis, in
some cases the findings are contradictory. We consider that the methodologies used in this paper,
both in the first and second stage of the analysis, can partly explain some of these conflicting views
on how the different covariates might impact on fund performance.
——————–
4. Results
4.1. Expected order-m and order-α efficiency estimates
Tables 2, 3, 4 and 5 report summary statistics (mean, 1st quartile, median, 3rd quartile and
standard deviation) for mutual fund efficiencies obtained using order-m and order-α. In both
cases results are reported for different choices of the tuning parameters. Specifically, we report
results for m = 75 and m = 150, in the case of order-m, and for α = 0.95 and α = 0.99, in the
case of order-α. Recall that, for both order-m and order-α, the higher the values of the tuning
parameters, the higher the similarities with the results obtained for FDH.
The joint evaluation, for all 32,959 fund-year pairs (whose efficiency is measured yearly), is
reported in the last row of each panel in Tables 4 and 5. Results are also reported for different
classifications of mutual funds. Specifically, we provide results using the manager classification
(managerial ownership, MC), multiple vs. single manager classification (MM), and sub-advising
(SADV ). The results according to fund classification are reported in Table 2 (order-m) and Table 3
(order-α), whose upper and lower panels correspond to different values of the trimming parameters
(m and α, respectively). As for the interpretation of efficiencies, since we are maximising in the
sense Farrell describes, the higher the value of the score, the lower the efficiency level. Therefore,
efficiency scores closer to unity indicate that the fund is actually more efficient.
A cursory look at the summary statistics reveals that performance varies remarkably across
categories of funds (small vs. mid-cap vs. large funds, blend vs. growth vs. value funds, funds
with managerial ownership vs. non-managerial ownership, funds managed by single managers vs.
funds managed by multiple managers, or the practice of sub-advising), across efficiency measures
(order-m vs. order-α), as well as different trimming parameters (m, α). Some stylized facts,
however, are robust to these sources of variation. For instance, the funds in the “blend” category
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are more efficient (lower efficiency values), on average, than either “growth” or “value” funds. This
result holds regardless of the summary statistic considered—not only the mean but also the 25th,
50th (the median) and 75th quantile. This robustness is also present for funds managed by a single
manager, whose efficiency is consistently worse than that of funds managed by multiple managers,
regardless of the summary statistic, efficiency measure or trimming parameter chosen (see Tables
4 and 5).
However, when comparing funds with managerial ownership with those without managerial
ownership (MC), patterns are not entirely robust across any of the dimensions considered. Under
such circumstances, one could a priori be inclined to conclude that the differences in performance
between these two types of funds are probably not significant. This conclusion calls for a specific
test, however. We examine this issue in greater detail in the next few paragraphs.
Although it is helpful to use several summary statistics as well as the mean when describing the
distributions of efficiency scores, it is even more informative to consider the graphical representation
of the entire distributions of efficiencies—obtained either using order-m or order-α. There are
several methods to do so, including univariate density functions estimated via kernel smoothing,
box plots, or their combination, namely, violin plots. In our view, this convenient combination of
densities and box plots makes violin plots a reasonable choice. In this case, the density trace is
plotted symmetrically to the left and right of the (vertical) box plot (i.e. there is no difference in
the density traces apart from the direction in which they extend). By adding these two densities
and the box plot we can compare distributions more easily (our purpose) than using density traces
only.
Figure 1 represents the violin plots for mutual fund efficiencies. It contains three subfigures
corresponding not only to order-m and order-α, but also to the non-robust DEA and FDH method-
ologies, in order to see more clearly how results vary depending on the methods used to measure
performance. Thus, Figure 1a provides violin plots for efficiencies obtained using DEA and FDH.
Since we are maximising in the sense Farrell describes, the minimum value is one. Efficiencies above
this threshold indicate that the analysed fund could increase its output using the same amount of
inputs as those funds on the efficient frontier. As expected, dropping the convexity assumption
naturally leads to a much higher number of efficient funds, a result that we can observe in the
violin plot corresponding to FDH.
The violin plots for order-m are not entirely coincidental. As shown in Figure 1b, results are
quite robust to the specification of the trimming parameter (m)—in this case, we considered an
additional parameter (m = 100) to see more clearly how results evolve depending on its value.
Recall that this parameter allows adjustment of the number of outliers. However, because we
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allow for the existence of outliers, we have a substantial amount of probability mass below unity,
which causes the shape of the violins to differ markedly from those obtained for DEA and FDH.
In fact, we have proper violins for order-m.
Finally, Figure 1c displays the violin plots for efficiencies obtained using order-α. In this case we
corroborate the magnitude of the impact of modifying the α parameter, which sets the percentage
of outliers, as in the order-m case; we also considered an additional parameter (α = .90) to see
more clearly how results evolve depending on the trimming parameter. We can also corroborate
that order-α results come close to those for FDH when a sufficiently high α parameter is set, as
shown by the third violin plot (α = .99).
The plots in Figure 1 therefore provide us with a graphical illustration of some features corre-
sponding to each of the techniques considered to measure mutual fund efficiency. Whereas Figure
1a clearly indicates that DEA and FDH do not allow for outliers, Figure 1b and Figure 1c plainly
show that the same does not hold for either order-m or order-α. However, in the case of order-α
the impact of the trimming parameter can be very strong, as shown by the violin plots correspond-
ing to α = .90 and α = .95, for which the number of outliers (efficiencies below unity) is quite
substantial.
4.2. The determinants of mutual fund performance: fund and managers’ character-
istics
Results on the determinants of mutual fund performance, considering the methods to measure
performance, are provided in Tables 6 (order-m, m = 75), 7 (order-m, m = 150) and 8 (order-α,
α = 0.99). We select a high value of α because it provides results close to those yielded by FDH.
Reporting results for other values of the trimming parameter and for other efficiency measurement
methods lends additional robustness to the analysis.
These tables provide coefficients and standard errors for selected quantiles (τ =
{.10, .25, .50, .75, .90}). Note that the quantile τ = .50 refers to the median of the conditional
distribution. Whilst OLS regressions report estimates based on the mean, quantile regression
based on τ = .50 provides an analogous result for a different moment of the distribution—i.e.
the median. Therefore, this median-regression model can be used to achieve the same goal as
conditional mean-regression modeling, namely, to represent the relationship between the central
location of the response and a set of covariates. However, as Hao and Naiman (2007) indicate,
when the distribution is highly skewed, which is the case of efficiency scores (many efficiency scores
are located in the vicinity of one), the mean can be difficult to interpret, whereas the median re-
mains highly informative (Hao and Naiman, 2007, p.3). The results in Tables 6, 7 and 8 go further
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in this respect, reporting results not only for the median (τ = .5) but also for other quantiles, and
are therefore much more informative.
In each of these tables (6–8) we provide quantile regression results for all selected covariates
(FS, FA, MC, MF , MM , TEN , MFS and SADV ). For each table, the dependent variable is
the efficiency of each fund yielded by order-m (with m = 75 and m = 150) and order-α (α = .99).
Recall that, as indicated above, since we are maximising in the sense Farrell describes, the higher
the value of the score, the lower the efficiency level (efficiencies closer to unity indicate higher
efficiency).
4.2.1. Fund characteristics
The results reported in these three tables clearly show the relevance of this type of analysis because
some conclusions could not be reached using other regression techniques such as OLS, or censored
regression. For instance, as shown in Table 6, taking into account the values obtained for the
first of the funds characteristics’ covariates, namely, fund size (FS), the impact on performance
is positive and significant (1%) throughout—recall that we are maximising in the sense Farrell
describes, so higher values indicate worse performance, therefore negative coefficients should be
interpreted inversely. This result is maintained across quantiles—i.e., regardless of the tau param-
eter considered—adding additional robustness to the finding. Robustness is also preserved, both in
terms of sign and significance of the coefficient, not only when setting other trimming parameters
for order-m (m = 150, see Table 7), but also when considering order-α (see Table 8). These strong
results do not entirely coincide with previous literature such as Choi and Murthi (2001), who found
no links between size and performance and, in general, with our conclusion in section 3.3 that the
evidence is inconclusive. Our results therefore suggest that economies of scale might emerge when
large fund performance is compared with that obtained for small funds—which might be more
inefficient than their larger counterparts due to the associated costs.
If conclusions had been based on a conditional-mean model (such as OLS), the information
obtained would have been constrained to the average effect. In our case, the conditional-median
effect (revealed by τ = .50) would indicate that the median effect is also positive and significant
and, in addition, we obtained information for the rest of the quantiles.
As for the other variable related to the funds’ characteristics, fund age (FA), its effect on
performance is mostly negative (positive coefficient) and significant. In addition, the magnitude of
the estimated coefficient is relatively stable—although it is larger for the lowest quantiles (τ = .10)
in the case of order-m with m = 75 (Table 6) and order-α (Table 8). This result is very robust,
not only for the different quantiles but also for the different measurement methods (order-m and
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order-α) and even for the different trimming parameters considered (m = 75 and m = 150). This
inverse relation between age and performance is also found in Hu and Chang (2008), implying that
performance decreases with the age of the fund or, older funds do not necessarily perform better
than newer ones.
4.2.2. Manager characteristics
We also provide results for the variables related to ownership. Managerial ownership (MC), which
can be either positive (MC = 1) or zero (MC = 0), has a generally negative impact (positive
coefficient), whose magnitude is large and significant throughout—regardless of the quantile τ or
trimming parameter (m) considered (see Tables 6 and 7). Results are robust when extending the
analysis to order-α (Table 8). We only find some differences when focusing on the magnitude of
the estimated coefficients, which are generally larger for order-m. However, the trend of higher
magnitude coefficients for the lowest quantiles is shared both for order-m (Tables 6 and 7) and
order-α (Table 8). This result is not entirely in line with the empirical evidence to date. Taking
into account the literature revised on page 12, only a few authors such as Kumlin and Puttonen
(2009) find this negative association between managerial ownership and performance. However,
none of the reviewed contributions considers regression quantiles and, therefore, cannot find that
the effect is particularly strong for the best performing funds (higher coefficients). These relatively
conflicting views imply that more research is needed, using different methods—if possible.
The multiple manager (team) or single manager variable (MM) is a dichotomous variable
taking a value of 1 (in the case of a team of managers) or 0 (in the case of a single manager).
Similarly to the manager classification variable (MC) the pattern is mostly negative (positive
coefficients) and significant for the vast majority of the quantiles. The only exception is for τ = .90
for order-munder m = 75, although the coefficient is not significant at the usual levels (see Table
6). Therefore, given the demonstrated robustness of the results for the different methodologies,
trimming parameters (α, m) and quantiles (τ), we may conclude there is a strong link between
performance and whether managers operate in a team or individually which, in this case, does
not favour teams of managers. It should be noted that previous empirical evidence comparing the
performance of team or individual managed funds is mixed. Some early studies found that team-
managed funds underperform individual-managed due to higher monitoring and coordination cost
(Chen et al., 2004). But Karagiannidis (2010) found mixed evidence and pointed out that previous
underperform of team-manager funds could be driven by funds that employed many investment
advisors with unknown management structures. More recently, Patel and Sarkissian (2017) have
found that using more accurate Morningstar Direct data (the same base data that we use), team-
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managed funds outperform single-managed funds. In this regard, Adams et al. (2018) suggest the
benefits of team management, mainly linked to the presence of active board monitoring. Therefore,
in line with this recent evidence, our results suggest that team management improve mutual fund
efficiency.
When analysing the impact of active manager tenure (TEN), the effect is weak and quite
unstable compared to the covariates evaluated above. For the particular case of order-m (Tables
6 and 7), the effect is not significant for any quantile (τ) considered; in the case of order-α, it is
only significant for the central quantiles (Table 8). Regardless of significance, the effect is volatile,
being negative (positive coefficient) for few quantiles τ = .25 and τ = .50 in the case of order-
m, which would indicate that tenure is not positive for fund performance, an effect which is even
stronger under order-α (only for τ = .90 is the coefficient positive, i.e., negative effect). This might
suggest a possible effect of overconfidence among more experienced managers, as well as some lack
of motivation. However, in line with evidence from Hambrick and Mason (1984) and Malhotra
et al. (2007), we also found that even in cases where the impact of tenure on performance was not
negative, it had no effect, i.e. it was not significant.
In contrast, the MF variable (number of funds under the same management) has a negative
impact (positive coefficient) throughout, which is mostly significant (1%) regardless of the partial
frontier method (order-m, order-α) and trimming parameter considered (m = 75, m = 150), with
the exception of the highest quantile (τ = .90). This would imply that the larger the number of
funds under the same management, the worse the performance of the fund, with the exception of
the worst performing funds, for which this effect would be irrelevant. In addition, this result is
quite robust, since even when switching to order-α (Table 8) not only is the sign of the impact
preserved for all quantiles but also significance does not change in any case. The magnitude of
the impact, in contrast, varies depending on the quantile selected, as it is especially high (in
absolute terms) for the lower quantiles, a result that is also robust across methods and trimming
parameters. Once more, these are results that are usually concealed by OLS regressions. The
reasons for this inverse relationship between performance and the number of managed funds are
explained, for instance, in Prather et al. (2004) and Hu and Chang (2008). According to these
authors, effectiveness is reduced when managers handle more than two funds. In addition, problems
related to diversification might emerge, as noted by Huij and Derwall (2011).
Finally, the sub-advising covariate (SADV ) has a negative impact on performance (due to the
positive sign of the coefficient), which is strongly significant throughout methodologies, trimming
parameters and quantiles. Only for the highest quantile (corresponding to the most inefficient
funds), i.e., τ = .90, does the effect becomes either unstable or non-significant. The former
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occurs for order-m, m = 150, since the sign of the coefficient changes (see Table 7), whereas
the latter corresponds to both order-m, m = 75, and order-α (Tables 6 and 8, respectively). Our
results indicate that those mutual funds that outsource their management obtain a lower efficiency,
especially in the case of the best funds, while for the worst funds this effect is irrelevant. This
result, globally evaluated, is in line with previous evidence in the literature. For instance, Chen
et al. (2013) find that outsourced funds underperform those managed internally and suggest this
might be due to contractual externalities and incentives. However, our methodology clarifies the
importance of the asymmetry of this effect: it is relevant to reduce the efficiency of the best
funds, but not to characterise the worst funds whose results are possibly attributable to poor
management, regardless of their degree of outsourcing
Previous studies, as indicated, focused on similar issues but considered sets of statistical tools
not always similar to the ones we considered here (especially combining partial frontier techniques
in the first stage and quantile regression in the second stage), as well as different samples, periods
and countries. Golec (1996), Annaert et al. (2003a), Hu and Chang (2008) and Ferreira et al.
(2013) stressed the importance of including not only the age of the fund and other non-manager
related factors but also some managers’ characteristics similar to those considered in our study.
Specifically, Golec’s (1996) study for 530 mutual funds for the 1988–1990 period, which indirectly
deals with the issues we deal here, concludes that older funds do not necessarily achieve better
performance—although the significance of this result was weak. In contrast, Annaert et al. (2003b)
do not find any relation between fund age and performance for a sample of 179 European equity
funds over the 1995–1998 period. Hu and Chang (2008) identify a negative link between perfor-
mance and the funds’ age in a study of 156 Taiwanese funds for 2005 and 2006. In research with
a much longer time span (similar to ours), Ferreira et al. (2013) conduct a cross-country study for
27 countries which includes 16,316 funds for the 1997–2007 period; their findings suggest that in
countries outside the US there is an inverse relationship between fund performance and age.
5. Conclusions
The mutual fund industry has been one of the fastest growing sectors within the capital markets
in many countries during recent decades. Although the 2007/08 international financial crisis led
to a slowdown in many countries, especially in those most affected by the crisis, the share of the
population that now own a mutual fund has increased dramatically in a relatively short period of
time. In parallel, the literature on mutual fund performance evaluation has also grown considerably.
A specific field of this literature is the analysis of whether managers add value to the performance
of the mutual funds they handle. The present study falls within this field.
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In contrast to the traditional methodologies for measuring mutual fund performance, our ap-
proach uses nonparametric (partial) frontiers due to certain key advantages they offer such as the
ability to simultaneously handle multiple factors while still providing the analyst with a single real
number as a performance index—the so-called efficiency scores. Although DEA (data envelopment
analysis) has been, by and large, the most intensely used frontier technique (considering both non-
parametric and parametric approaches), in recent years this literature has evolved and some of the
estimators used now are superior in several aspects, especially in terms of robustness.
After measuring performance in this first stage of the analysis, the second stage analysed the
determinants of mutual fund performance. This was not an easy task for two reasons, one sub-
stantive, the other methodological. The substantive reason relates to the difficulties encountered
by the mutual fund literature in finding conclusive evidence on the impact of certain variables on
performance. The methodological reason concerns the difficulties in conducting inference in the
second stage of the analysis when efficiencies are yielded by linear programming methods in the
first stage. The quantile regression methods we use offer an advantage on both counts. On the
one hand, they provide information as to whether the estimated coefficients might differ (in terms
of sign, magnitude and significance) depending on the quantile of the conditional distribution of
performance, which would ultimately allow some of the conflicting views found in the literature to
be reconciled. On the other hand, quantile regression methods are much more robust to both the
existence of outliers and skewed distributions of the dependent variable.
Our results are therefore robust in various dimensions. The first stage of the analysis was
performed considering several partial frontier techniques, and several tuning parameters (m, in the
case of order-m, and α, in the case of order-α), i.e., two levels of robustness. In the second stage of
the analysis, a third level of robustness was added, since results were provided for five quantiles of
the conditional distribution of performance. The findings suggest that, indeed, the links among the
variables considered are intricate, and difficult to summarise in an average effect. Only in the case
of the age of the fund did we find an effect whose magnitude, sign, and significance is broadly robust
across the three levels of robustness—the higher the age, the worse the performance. However,
in the case of the variables reflecting managers’ characteristics, the different methodologies and
tuning parameters indicate that the findings cannot be boiled down to an average effect for the
average fund.
Therefore, we consider our paper constitutes an innovative application in the sense that it eval-
uates how different managerial characteristics, some of which have been gaining great importance
in recent times (see Moreno et al., 2018), affect funds’ performance using a combination of OR
(partial frontiers) and regression strategies (based on quantile regression) that had barely been
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considered previously. This combination offers several advantages over previous studies, due to
the robustness of the order-m and order-α methods used in the first stage, and the possibility to
ascertain whether the selected covariates impact differently on the best and the worst funds—a
finding which makes this field of research very promising.
While the research has largely analysed the role of fund characteristics, managers’ character-
istics are also attracting interest due the important role they play in this scenario. However, this
is one of the few studies that simultaneously provide detailed insights on this issue. Additionally
the methodologies applied suggest a new path for continued exploration in other fund industries.
The results suggest that the manager is just as important as the fund; thus, before reaching their
selection decision, investors should be aware of the variables that can have an indisputable impact
on their wealth.
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Table 1: Descriptive statistics for inputs and outputs, mutual funds (2000–2016)a
Inputs Outputs
Fund category
Std.dev.
(%, x1)
Kurtosisb
(x2)
Expense
ratio (%,
x3)
Turnover
(x4)
Beta (x5)
Returns
(%, y1)
Skewnessb
(y2)
Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median
Number
of
funds
US Fund, Small Blend 5.176 4.429 0.228 0.209 1.352 1.300 74.725 54.000 1.193 1.194 0.595 0.611 0.476 0.485 3,022
US Fund, Small Growth 5.782 5.003 0.200 0.174 1.480 1.400 111.340 87.000 1.258 1.197 0.578 0.579 0.486 0.483 3,480
US Fund, Small Value 5.097 4.336 0.249 0.222 1.403 1.417 90.303 54.000 1.158 1.179 0.602 0.621 0.469 0.478 1,441
US Fund, Mid-Cap Blend 4.707 3.939 0.238 0.207 1.258 1.295 90.830 54.000 1.110 1.090 0.583 0.581 0.479 0.472 1,849
US Fund, Mid-Cap Growth 5.218 4.343 0.211 0.182 1.397 1.360 107.724 79.000 1.176 1.126 0.569 0.563 0.504 0.493 3,146
US Fund, Mid-Cap Value 4.602 3.893 0.255 0.232 1.271 1.272 82.363 61.000 1.083 1.082 0.589 0.594 0.471 0.464 1,369
US Fund, Large Blend 4.080 3.655 0.244 0.233 1.114 1.150 69.133 44.000 0.991 0.999 0.563 0.565 0.482 0.477 6,468
US Fund, Large Growth 4.495 4.020 0.214 0.181 1.292 1.260 89.045 64.000 1.075 1.047 0.559 0.557 0.514 0.505 6,653
US Fund, Large Value 4.086 3.693 0.260 0.248 1.210 1.193 65.745 47.000 0.972 0.978 0.575 0.598 0.465 0.466 4,787
Other categoriesc 4.074 3.532 0.271 0.254 1.120 1.190 68.781 38.000 0.989 0.997 0.558 0.557 0.477 0.463 737
a The table presents some descriptive statistics of the mutual fund sample. The sample period runs from January 1st, 2000 to December 31st, 2016. The size
is measured by the assets in millions of US dollars and management fees and loads costs are shown as percentages of the assets. Return (y1) is the monthly
average return.
b Both kurtosis and skewness have been rescaled in order to facilitate the computation of efficiencies.
c The remainder categories correspond to: (i) US Fund, Allocation 50%-70% Equity; (ii) US Fund, Allocation 70%-85% Equity; (iii) US Fund, Allocation 85%
Equity; (iv) US Fund, Convertibles; (v) US Fund, Diversified Emerging Markets; (vi) US Fund, Health; (vii) US Fund, Infrastructure; (viii) US Fund, Long
Short Equity; (ix) US Fund, Market Neutral; (x) US Fund, Option Writing; (xi) US Fund, Tactical Allocation; (xii) US Fund, Technology; (xiii) US Fund,
World Allocation; (xiv) US Fund, World Large Stock; (xv) US Fund, World Small Mid Stock; (xvi) US Insurance, Mid Cap Growth; (xvii) US Insurance, Small
Growth.
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Table 2: Order-m efficiencies, mutual funds classified by classes (2000–2016)
m = 75
Type (class)
of fund
Mean
1st quar-
tile
Median
3rd quar-
tile
Std.dev.
Number
of funds
US Fund, Small Blend 110.1599 97.4173 108.6496 124.6439 22.0991 3,022
US Fund, Small Growth 117.6822 100.0000 114.9646 130.6111 23.8668 3,480
US Fund, Small Value 112.5306 99.2623 111.1111 127.5575 23.1035 1,441
US Fund, Mid-Cap Blend 106.5866 94.4394 104.6611 121.6193 23.2098 1,849
US Fund, Mid-Cap Growth 113.2369 98.8539 108.8549 125.0933 22.4221 3,146
US Fund, Mid-Cap Value 108.3717 97.4597 106.5523 120.6636 20.0978 1,369
US Fund, Large Blend 98.7155 89.2269 99.8575 111.2096 21.0954 6,468
US Fund, Large Growth 106.5694 97.1857 103.5739 115.8931 19.3512 6,653
US Fund, Large Value 103.2680 94.1664 101.9159 112.5203 16.4970 4,787
Other categories 95.5304 85.5361 99.0580 109.0915 27.0469 737
m = 150
Type (class)
of fund
Mean
1st quar-
tile
Median
3rd quar-
tile
Std.dev.
Number
of funds
US Fund, Small Blend 115.1678 99.9096 112.8846 129.8225 21.9680 3,022
US Fund, Small Growth 122.7411 102.4154 119.5132 136.8287 25.1715 3,480
US Fund, Small Value 116.8999 100.0000 113.9083 132.7299 23.3588 1,441
US Fund, Mid-Cap Blend 111.9636 98.7781 108.6437 126.3061 22.6507 1,849
US Fund, Mid-Cap Growth 117.9224 100.0000 112.5968 130.0983 23.6887 3,146
US Fund, Mid-Cap Value 112.6753 99.8143 109.7854 124.8919 19.8973 1,369
US Fund, Large Blend 104.1777 95.2937 102.1892 115.4275 19.3492 6,468
US Fund, Large Growth 110.9463 99.7277 106.8563 120.5548 19.5686 6,653
US Fund, Large Value 107.7184 98.1378 105.1422 116.6539 16.0547 4,787
Other categories 101.6579 91.7662 100.3297 114.0628 24.9505 737
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Table 3: Order-α efficiencies, mutual funds classified by classes (2000–2016)
α = .95
Type (class)
of fund
Mean
1st quar-
tile
Median
3rd quar-
tile
Std.dev.
Number
of funds
US Fund, Small Blend 92.7574 79.6866 97.1950 108.6412 24.6143 3,022
US Fund, Small Growth 100.5426 88.8800 100.0000 113.4176 22.9598 3,480
US Fund, Small Value 97.2450 86.3387 100.0000 111.2495 23.6440 1,441
US Fund, Mid-Cap Blend 88.3921 74.3701 94.1996 105.5489 27.0747 1,849
US Fund, Mid-Cap Growth 96.9683 84.8545 99.2362 109.2374 21.8777 3,146
US Fund, Mid-Cap Value 94.1400 83.4380 97.2608 106.3647 20.4308 1,369
US Fund, Large Blend 80.5497 65.8393 87.9253 100.0000 27.0952 6,468
US Fund, Large Growth 92.0186 82.8483 94.8287 102.0384 20.1950 6,653
US Fund, Large Value 88.1208 78.0987 90.9299 100.0000 19.6245 4,787
Other categories 78.8368 62.6340 85.2607 100.0000 29.8133 737
α = .99
Type (class)
of fund
Mean
1st quar-
tile
Median
3rd quar-
tile
Std.dev.
Number
of funds
US Fund, Small Blend 109.8701 100.0000 108.3785 123.8978 22.5341 3,022
US Fund, Small Growth 117.0833 100.0000 114.2252 129.4983 23.2474 3,480
US Fund, Small Value 112.3023 100.0000 110.6190 127.1966 23.5873 1,441
US Fund, Mid-Cap Blend 105.7627 97.0676 103.7964 120.5743 24.2307 1,849
US Fund, Mid-Cap Growth 112.7204 100.0000 108.1778 124.2101 22.0359 3,146
US Fund, Mid-Cap Value 108.4726 100.0000 106.5301 120.0000 19.0130 1,369
US Fund, Large Blend 98.4102 90.9091 100.0000 110.3470 21.9428 6,468
US Fund, Large Growth 106.3806 100.0000 102.6353 115.1691 18.7312 6,653
US Fund, Large Value 102.6777 95.4742 100.6865 111.6739 17.2657 4,787
Other categories 95.7725 86.3587 100.0000 108.8412 26.8258 737
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Table 4: Order-m efficiencies, mutual funds (2000–2016)
m = 75
Type of fund Mean
1st quar-
tile
Median
3rd quar-
tile
Std.dev.
Manager
classification (MC)
MC = 1 106.3411 96.2404 103.9388 117.5943 20.4949
MC = 0 107.1374 95.5973 104.4936 119.5831 22.9645
Multiple/single
managers (MM)
Multiple managers (MM = 1) 105.6185 95.6763 103.5769 117.0645 20.5373
Single manager (MM = 0) 108.1592 96.2779 105.0343 120.5853 23.3049
Fund Sub-advisor
(SADV )
SADV = 1 107.4193 96.6628 104.9330 119.1863 20.3717
SADV = 0 106.3600 95.3916 103.7291 118.2859 22.7807
All funds 106.7742 95.9318 104.2181 118.6600 21.8761
m = 150
Type of fund Mean
1st quar-
tile
Median
3rd quar-
tile
Std.dev.
Manager
classification (MC)
MC = 1 110.8839 99.4191 107.2442 122.1266 20.3021
MC = 0 112.2491 99.1563 108.2764 124.2469 22.7753
Multiple/single
managers (MM)
Multiple managers (MM = 1) 110.3483 99.1591 106.9402 121.5702 20.1086
Single manager (MM = 0) 113.1581 99.4476 108.9200 125.4588 23.3591
Fund Sub-advisor
(SADV )
SADV = 1 112.1076 99.5921 108.4192 123.6441 20.3175
SADV = 0 111.3174 99.0245 107.3074 123.0144 22.5267
All funds 111.6264 99.2896 107.7375 123.2558 21.6927
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Table 5: Order-α efficiencies, mutual funds (2000–2016)
α = .95
Type of fund Mean
1st quar-
tile
Median
3rd quar-
tile
Std.dev.
Manager
classification (MC)
MC = 1 90.9923 80.4453 94.8678 103.5736 22.6159
MC = 0 90.0280 78.1971 94.0908 104.7345 25.3621
Multiple/single
managers (MM)
Multiple managers (MM = 1) 89.6411 79.1091 94.1192 103.2258 23.6198
Single manager (MM = 0) 91.4595 79.6137 94.9059 105.5797 24.7423
Fund Sub-advisor
(SADV )
SADV = 1 91.2189 80.8319 94.7657 104.5577 22.8790
SADV = 0 89.9827 78.3758 94.2780 103.9464 24.9295
All funds 90.4676 79.3064 94.4556 104.1953 24.1531
α = .99
Type of fund Mean
1st quar-
tile
Median
3rd quar-
tile
Std.dev.
Manager
classification (MC)
MC = 1 106.1173 99.1617 103.1052 117.1875 20.5662
MC = 0 106.6643 98.2213 103.6309 118.7164 23.0754
Multiple/single
managers (MM)
Multiple managers (MM = 1) 105.2586 98.1008 102.7616 116.5850 20.8396
Single manager (MM = 0) 107.8025 99.2694 104.1581 119.8087 23.1752
Fund Sub-advisor
(SADV )
SADV = 1 106.8381 99.1076 104.1728 118.2873 20.7652
SADV = 0 106.1417 98.2192 102.7958 117.8603 22.7074
All funds 106.4149 98.6466 103.3883 118.0144 21.9683
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Table 6: Regression quantiles for mutual fund performance, order-m (m = 75)
Quantile (τ )
Covariates
0.10
(best
performance)
0.25 0.50 0.75
0.90
(worst
performance)
(Intercept) 95.748
(4.928)
98.673
(2.103)
111.558
(1.946)
131.512
(2.550)
162.999
(5.169)
FS −1.792
(0.149)
−1.048
(0.087)
−1.121
(0.086)
−1.738
(0.108)
−2.539
(0.150)
FA 0.143
(0.014)
0.078
(0.016)
0.078
(0.014)
0.072
(0.012)
0.093
(0.021)
MC 7.817
(0.835)
4.663
(0.399)
2.698
(0.363)
2.236
(0.449)
1.967
(0.528)
MM 2.853
(0.843)
1.750
(0.415)
1.940
(0.348)
2.003
(0.466)
−0.023
(0.620)
TEN 0.030
(0.050)
−0.040
(0.031)
−0.028
(0.029)
0.010
(0.032)
0.046
(0.048)
MFS 0.048
(0.016)
0.022
(0.007)
0.016
(0.007)
0.013
(0.008)
0.011
(0.011)
SADV 4.084
(0.759)
2.700
(0.357)
1.642
(0.354)
1.383
(0.427)
0.122
(0.562)
FS: fund size; FA: fund age; MC: managerial ownership (dichotomous variable, which takes value
of 1 when it exists, zero otherwise); MM : multiple/team of managers (dichotomous variable, 1: team
of managers; 0: otherwise); TEN : active manager tenure; MFS: number of funds under the same
management; SADV : sub-advisor ((dichotomous variable, 1: yes; 0: no).
Table 7: Regression quantiles for mutual fund performance, order-m (m = 150)
Quantile (τ )
Covariates
0.10
(best
performance)
0.25 0.50 0.75
0.90
(worst
performance)
(Intercept) 98.800
(3.247)
101.422
(1.943)
115.814
(1.549)
138.500
(3.450)
172.621
(4.294)
FS −1.135
(0.101)
−0.651
(0.060)
−1.147
(0.080)
−1.936
(0.119)
−2.728
(0.144)
FA 0.093
(0.009)
0.049
(0.012)
0.076
(0.012)
0.083
(0.017)
0.091
(0.014)
MC 4.727
(0.545)
2.719
(0.259)
2.467
(0.348)
2.348
(0.494)
2.091
(0.535)
MM 1.958
(0.542)
1.122
(0.260)
1.839
(0.328)
1.866
(0.567)
0.370
(0.747)
TEN 0.003
(0.028)
−0.005
(0.022)
−0.025
(0.027)
0.045
(0.038)
0.046
(0.047)
MFS 0.025
(0.010)
0.014
(0.005)
0.018
(0.007)
0.009
(0.010)
0.012
(0.011)
SADV 2.873
(0.424)
1.774
(0.242)
1.554
(0.324)
1.401
(0.462)
−0.225
(0.538)
FS: fund size; FA: fund age; MC: managerial ownership (dichotomous variable, which takes value
of 1 when it exists, zero otherwise); MM : multiple/team of managers (dichotomous variable, 1: team
of managers; 0: otherwise); TEN : active manager tenure; MFS: number of funds under the same
management; SADV : sub-advisor (dichotomous variable, 1: yes; 0: no).
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Table 8: Regression quantiles for mutual fund performance, order-α (α = .99)
Quantile (τ )
Covariates
0.10
(best
performance)
0.25 0.50 0.75
0.90
(worst
performance)
(Intercept) 80.277
(7.573)
86.953
(3.449)
98.232
(3.137)
118.421
(2.481)
133.909
(2.098)
FS −3.148
(0.270)
−2.099
(0.150)
−1.398
(0.089)
−1.510
(0.084)
−1.921
(0.103)
FA 0.286
(0.051)
0.171
(0.016)
0.098
(0.014)
0.090
(0.012)
0.061
(0.020)
MC 16.833
(1.125)
9.693
(0.755)
4.096
(0.449)
2.460
(0.371)
1.827
(0.418)
MM 5.454
(1.348)
3.882
(0.725)
2.212
(0.442)
1.595
(0.372)
0.606
(0.426)
TEN −0.096
(0.089)
−0.098
(0.047)
−0.081
(0.031)
−0.065
(0.029)
0.017
(0.040)
MFS 0.075
(0.028)
0.044
(0.013)
0.024
(0.008)
0.013
(0.007)
0.000
(0.009)
SADV 6.723
(1.171)
5.047
(0.598)
1.746
(0.390)
1.562
(0.332)
0.109
(0.421)
FS: fund size; FA: fund age; MC: managerial ownership (dichotomous variable, which takes value
of 1 when it exists, zero otherwise); MM : multiple/team of managers (dichotomous variable, 1: team
of managers; 0: otherwise); TEN : active manager tenure; MFS: number of funds under the same
management; SADV : sub-advisor (dichotomous variable, 1: yes; 0: no).
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